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Summary
Choosing long-term goals is a key issue in the climate policy agenda. Targets should be
easily measurable and feasible, but also effective in damage control. Once goals are set
globally, given the uncertainty affecting long-term strategies and region-specific
preferences for different policy instruments, policies will be better represented by a
diversified portfolio to be revised over time, rather than “once and forever” decisions. It
therefore becomes crucial to understand to what extent different strategies (or policy
portfolios) are consistent with long-term targets, that is, when they imply emission paths
which do not irreversibly diverge from globally set goals. The present paper aims to
investigate emission paths implied by plausible policy scenarios against those derived
by imposing alternative long-term targets, comparing, for example, differences in peak
periods. Plausible policy scenarios are for instance Kyoto-type targets with or without
participation by the U.S. and/or by developing countries. Different long-term targets
considered focus on stabilisation of CO2 concentrations, radiative forcing and the
increase in atmospheric temperature relative to pre-industrial levels. In order to account
for the uncertainty surrounding the climate cycle, for each long-term goal multiple paths
of emission - the most probable, the optimistic and the pessimistic ones - are considered
in the comparison exercise. Comparative analysis is performed using a newly developed
version of the FEEM-RICE model, a regional economy-climate model of optimal
economic growth which is based on Nordhaus and Boyer’s RICE model crucially
extended in order to account for induced technical change. In particular, both carbon
and energy intensity are affected by a new endogenous variable – Technical Progress –
which captures both the role of Learning by Researching and of Learning by Doing.
These are in turn determined by the optimal levels of Research and Development and of
Emission Abatement.
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1. Introduction 
Goals are for the long run, policies for the short run. Goals relate to what we should 
do, policies more often than not relate to what we can do. In their implementation process 
policies often are subject to various constraints imposed by policy making, goals are more 
easily set. In the case of climate change this general statement is especially relevant and acute. 
Evidence has been accumulating on the need to take action against the effects of climate 
change. The policies envisaged by the Kyoto Protocol during the first commitment period 
2008-2012 are a major example. At the same time, because of the long time horizon over 
which  climate  change  displays  its  effects,  goals  are  set  in  the  distant  future.  Indeed,  no 
reference to goals in terms of, say, temperature, radiative forcing, concentrations, is made in 
the Kyoto protocol itself. 
Alternative goals can be stated and proposed just like alternative policy portfolios may 
be conceived and suggested. Most, if not all, of these have been subject to study. However, a 
clearly relevant issue is how congruent policy packages and goals are with each other. And 
this is an issue much less studied. One of the few exceptions is represented by the present 
paper.  In  it  we  try  to  get  some  insights  on  how  short  term  policies,  which  are  strongly 
connected  with  the  actual  socio-political  scenario  and  economic  constraints  binding 
abatement expenditures, are related with long-term goals, which are generally proposed by the 
scientific community being more concerned with the importance of immediate unconditional 
GHGs abatement. 
The  analysis  conducted  here  is  based  on  the  FEEM-RICE  model,  a  multi-region 
optimal growth model incorporating a climate module: with it we investigate the magnitude 
of anthropogenic emissions over time when different climate policies, such as those of the   3 
Kyoto  Protocol,  are  adopted.  Those  emission  paths  are  then  compared  with  emissions 
deriving from scenarios where global targets, such as a constraint on global temperature, 
radiative forcing or on atmospheric carbon concentrations, have been imposed. The  main 
reason for this exercise is that uncertainty surrounding the climate change cycle makes it very 
hard for the scientific community to agree upon an “acceptable” level of greenhouse gas 
concentrations:  see,  for  example,  Schneider  (2001).  This  implies  that  the  main  policy 
objective should be to keep human activities on a reversible path of emissions which leaves 
open future options to stabilize concentration to some “secure” level. “It is obvious that no 
‘once forever’ solution exists (...) the most promising approach to climate policy is sequential 
decision making (...) Short term strategies are then crafted so that both GHG emissions and 
the underlying socio-economic processes (resource use, technologies) evolve in a direction 
which  makes  future  course  corrections  in  any  direction  the  least  expensive.”  (Toth  and 
Mwandosya, 2001) 
Because uncertainty is central to the problem of reconciling policies and goals, in the 
paper we also explicitly tackle the issue of how uncertainty affects the most critical model 
parameters through sensitivity analysis. In particular, long-term goal scenarios are simulated 
for different values of a few key FEEM-RICE parameters which define the climate sensitivity 
to a doubling of carbon atmospheric concentration and the carbon rate of retention in the 
atmosphere.  
In general the simulation results appear to suggest that some policy action should take 
place not too late for the short term policy scenarios we have identified to be compatible with 
our chosen long term targets. In particular, it is to be noted that the Kyoto regime soon to start 
appears to be on a compatible emission path, at least up to the second commitment period. 
Zooming in on the first half of the simulation period, we find that the most stringent targets   4 
for concentrations and temperature reduction are clearly out of reach of any policy that could 
be decided for the first commitment period. In addition, the Kyoto scenario during the first 
commitment period turns out to actually be below the 550 ppmV stabilization target. This is 
however not so if we adopt a 2.5
oC temperature reduction as our final target. Looking at the 
uncertainty affecting the climate parameters of the model, it clearly emerges that if they take 
on a pessimistic value, then we are gravely underestimating our mitigation efforts. This is not 
so  however  in  the  most  probable  situation  and  even  more  so  in  the  optimistic  case.  In 
particular  the  Kyoto  scenario,  with  which  we  are  especially  concerned,  is  compatible,  or 
actually  below,  both  the  most  probable  and  optimistic  550  ppmV  concentrations  targets. 
Instead, when we look at temperature the Kyoto policy is in 2035 below the optimistic case 
but above the most probable situation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes and compares 
advantages  and  disadvantages  of  alternative  targets.  Section  3  sketches  the  FEEM-RICE 
model and describes the treatment of induced technical change, a fundamental ingredient of 
climate-economy models for long term analysis. Section 4 presents the results. 
 
2. Comparison of Alternative Targets 
The climate change cycle represented in Figure 1 consists of earlier stages, namely 
human and natural activities producing greenhouse gasses emissions, and final stages, namely 
the damage feedback effect, both on human activity and on the ecosystems. It is possible to 
consider  constraints  and  targets  on  each  of  these  different  phases  of  the  cycle.  Different 
targets  present  advantages  and  shortcomings  as  thoroughly  discussed  by,  for  instance, 
Pershing and Tudela (2003).   5 
In general, focusing on earlier stages (such as production or emissions) means having 
more  precise  information  on  what  the  required  effort  should  be,  but  it  may  not  produce 
effectively the desired effects, mainly because of the loose relationship between actions and 
climate impacts. The reverse is true for targets imposed on later stages. 
The IPCC conventionally has concentrated its attention on the earlier phases of the 
cycle, namely by imposing constraints on atmospheric emissions of tons of greenhouse gasses 
or  on  emission  intensity  (emissions  per  unit  of  output),  (see  IPCC,  2001).  Targets  on 
emissions are relatively easy to identify, to implement and to measure. However, given a 
certain level of emissions through time, resulting concentrations of gasses in different layers 
of the atmosphere are extremely uncertain and, consequently, it is hard to forecast how severe 
the final impacts on the climate system and on human activities are going to be. Indeed, each 
subsequent phase of the chain is highly characterized by uncertainty, thereby making accurate 
forecasts difficult and scarcely reliable. Nevertheless, targets on actual and future emissions 
allows to better understand who should undertake abatement efforts and when, thus providing 
clearer grounds for the international equity debate and climate negotiations among the parties. 
Article  2  of  the  United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change 
(UNFCCC)  states  that  the  goal  is  the  “stabilization  of  greenhouse  gases  (GHGs) 
concentrations  in the atmosphere”, thus  moving  the  policy  focus  one  step  forward  in  the 
climate  cycle.  While  Sarofim,  Forest,  Reiner  and  Reilly  (2004)  discuss  whether  separate 
concentration targets should be established for each GHG, Wigley, Richels and Edmonds 
(1996) discuss the issue of stabilizing carbon concentration in the atmosphere and what are 
the implications in terms of timing the necessary effort. Setting the control on concentrations 
implies a less immediate link between the desired goal and the necessary action, a fact that is 
also true in the cases of targets on radiative forcing or on the rate and magnitude of the change   6 
of atmospheric temperature. Many recent scientific studies have emphasized the need to go 
beyond  GHGs  atmospheric  concentration  targets  and  move  forward  in  the  climate  cycle. 
Richels,  Manne  and  Wigley  (2004)  discuss  the  issue  of  imposing  a  cap  on  temperature 
increase and the potential beneficial effect on treating relevant uncertainty, while Sarofim, 
Forest,  Reiner  and  Reilly  (2004)  discuss  the  issue  of  stabilizing  radiative  forcing.  The 
motivation for this is both scientific - a greater control on the climate phenomena effects 
might be attained - and policy oriented - these targets incorporate a greater deal of information 
and consideration which are critical for policy makers. Given the global nature of any climate 
policy and, therefore, of these targets, it becomes necessary to think of ways of accordingly 
distributing the effort (for example in terms of emission rights) among different countries, 
following some equity or efficiency criterion (e.g., on the basis of GDP per capita). For a 
detailed  discussion  on  various  participation  incentives  the  reader  is  referred  to  Bosello, 
Buchner and Carraro (2003) and Buchner and Carraro (2003a; 2003b). Both in the case of 
atmospheric concentrations and of temperature complications in the measurement phase are 
absent. However, complications arise when actually trying to measure efforts relative to the 
defined targets. 
Finally, as for targets at the final stages of the climate cycle, the major benefit would 
be that of having direct control on the amount of damage, which is exactly what a policy 
eventually would aim to control. The target could take the form of a limit on sea level rise, 
loss of ecosystems or of economic activities or some other identifiable indicators. Hence, a 
direct cost-benefit analysis of climate policy would be available. Two problems limit the 
applicability of this last approach. First, the current limited ability of quantifying damages. 
Second, the distance between the object under control (final impact) and the control itself 
grows even larger, thus making this approach, quite unlikely in terms of implementability.    7 
For  the  just  mentioned  reasons,  in  this  paper  we  concentrate  our  attention  on 
investigating and comparing the first four categories of targets, namely different targets on 
emissions (which we will refer to also as short-term policy scenarios in order to emphasize 
their scarce connection with long-term objectives), on one side, and constraints on GHGs 
atmospheric concentrations, radiative forcing and increase in temperature (which we refer as 
long-term stabilization scenarios), on the other side. 
 
3. The FEEM-RICE Model 
The analysis of the issues discussed in the previous section is conducted by means of a 
numerical climate-economy model called FEEM-RICE. The FEEM-RICE model, which we 
briefly describe here, is an extended version of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000)’s RICE model. 
This  is  a  Ramsey-Koopmans  single  sector  optimal  growth  model  suitably  extended  to 
incorporate the interactions between economic activities and climate. There is one such model 
for each of the eight macro regions into which the world is divided: USA, Other High Income 
countries  (OHI),  OECD  Europe  (Europe),  Russia  and  Eastern  European  countries  (REE), 
Middle Income countries (MI), Lower Middle Income countries (LMI), China (CHN), and 
Low Income countries (LI).
1 
Within each region a central planner chooses the optimal paths of two controls, fixed 
investment and carbon energy input, so as to maximize welfare, defined as the present value 
of  per  capita  consumption.  The  value  added,  absorbed  from  production  (net  of  climate 
change) according to a constant returns technology, is used for investment and consumption, 
after  subtraction  of  energy  spending.  The  technology  is  Cobb-Douglas  and  combines  the 
                                                 
1 The countries belonging to each one of the macro-regions above indicated are listed in Nordhaus and Boyer 
(2000). The aggregation in macro-regions does not account for the enlargement process which took place on 1
st 
of May 2004.    8 
inputs from capital, labor and carbon energy together with the level of technology. Population 
(taken to be equal to full employment) and technology levels grow over time in an exogenous 
fashion, whereas capital accumulation is governed by the optimal rate of investment. 
The carbon-energy input is modeled as being the source of GHGs emissions in the 
production process, and cumulated emissions (i.e. concentrations) cause an increase in the 
worldwide  temperature.  To  close  the  circle,  global  temperature  (relative  to  pre-industrial 
levels) is responsible for the wedge between gross output and output net of climate change 
effects.  
In FEEM-RICE each country plays a non-cooperative Nash game in a dynamic setting 
leading  to  an  Open  Loop  Nash  equilibrium.  This  is  a  situation  where  in each region  the 
planner maximizes its utility subject to the individual resource and capital constraints and the 
climate module for a given emission production of all the other players.  
The major innovation of the FEEM-RICE model is the endogenization of the process 
of technical change (TC hereafter). In many top-down climate-economy  models technical 
progress has been often depicted as an exogenous process. This feature is also shared by the 
original RICE model in which the following production function (n indexes regions, t time 
periods) is specified: 
 
(1)  ) , ( ] ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( )[ , ( ) , (
1 t n CE p t n L t n CE t n K t n A t n Q
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- - g a a g  
 
where  Q  is  output  (gross  of  climate  change  effects),  A  the  exogenously  given  level  of 
technology, KF, CE and L are the inputs from physical capital, carbon energy and labor, 
respectively, and p
E is the fossil fuel price. In addition, carbon emissions are proportional to 
carbon energy, that is:   9 
 
(2)  E(n,t) = V(n,t)CE(n,t) 
 
where E is industrial CO2 emissions, while V is an idiosyncratic carbon intensity ratio which 
also exogenously declines over time.
2 In this way, Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) make the 
assumption of a gradual, costless improvement of the green technology gained by the agents 
as time passes. 
We consider this treatment of TC as non satisfactory for a model designed to study 
issues related to climate change. In particular, the induced nature of the bulk of technical 
innovation should be recognized and consequently modeled.
 3 
In FEEM-RICE we focus on two distinct sources of potential TC: the energy intensity of 
production and the carbon intensity of energy use. These two aspects allow us to address 
energy-saving as well as energy-switching issues. The main novelty of our new formulation 
hinges on a new variable, which we call (with poor inventive activity) Technical Progress, 
which accounts both Learning-by-Researching and Learning-by-Doing at the same time. We 
assume  that  innovation  is  brought  about  by  R&D  spending  which  contributes  to  the 
accumulation of the stock of existing knowledge. In addition to this Learning-by-Researching 
effect, the model accounts also for the effect of Learning-by-Doing, now modeled in terms of 
cumulated abatement efforts. Thus, Technical Progress TP is defined as follows: 
 
                                                 
2 Throughout the paper we will indifferently refer to ‘environmental’ technology or ‘green’ technology when 
mentioning the time-varying coefficient V. 
3 The RICE model has been used by Nordhaus (2002) himself and by Popp (2003) to lay out a model of induced 
innovation brought about by R&D efforts. Both use the non-regional version of the model, called DICE.   10 
(4)  )] , ( ), , ( [ ) , ( t n K t n ABAT f t n TP R =  
 
The  variable  TP  is conceived to affect  both energy  intensity  (i.e., the  quantity  of  carbon 
energy  required  to  produce  one  unit  of  output)  and  carbon  intensity  (i.e.,  the  level  of 
carbonization  of  primarily  used  fuels).  More  specifically  TP  is  formulated  as  a  convex 






S t n K t n ABAT t n TP ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( =  
 
where  ) , ( t n K R   is  the  stock  of  knowledge  and  ABATS  represents  the  stock  of  cumulated 
abatement, in turn defined as: 
 
(6)  ) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) 1 , ( t n ABAT t n ABAT t n ABAT S A F S d - + = +  
 
A d  being the depreciation rate of cumulated experience and ABATF the abatement flow. The 
stock of knowledge  ) , ( t n K R  instead accumulates in the usual fashion: 
 
(7)  ) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( & ) 1 , ( t n K t n D R t n K R R R d - + = +  
 
R d  being the depreciation rate of knowledge. 
  How does the Technical progress affect the rest of the economy? As seen in equation 
(1), the factors of production are labour, physical capital and effective energy. Let us first 
consider the effect of technical progress on factor productivity (the energy intensity effect). In   11 
this  case  the  production  function  is  modified  so  that  (1)  is  replaced  by  the  following 
specification: 
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and  n n 1 0   and   b b   are  region  specific  parameters.  Thus,  an  increase  in  the  endogenously 
determined Technical Progress variable reduces – ceteris paribus – the output elasticity of the 
energy  input.  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  output  technology  in  (1’)  also  accounts  for  TC 
evolving exogenously. 
  Let us now turn to the effect of technical progress on the carbon intensity of energy 
consumption. As shown in (2) effective energy results from for both fossil fuels input use and 
(exogenous) TC in the energy sector. We postulate in this case that TP serves the purpose of 
reducing, ceteris paribus, the level of carbon emissions. More precisely: 
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Here an increase in TP reduces progressively the amount of emissions generated by a unit of 
fossil fuel consumed. 
We finally recognize that R&D spending absorbs some resources, that is:   12 
 
(9)  ) , ( ) ( ) , ( & ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( t n NIP t p t n D R t n I t n C t n Y
p + + + =  
 
where  Y  is  output  net  of  climate  change  effects,  C  is  consumption,  I  gross  fixed  capital 
formation, R&D research and development expenditures, p
P is the equilibrium price on the 
emissions rights, and NIP is the net quantity of permits demanded on the relative markets 
(when positive; otherwise, it just indicates the supplied quantity on the same  market). In 
summary, our formulation introduces R&D as a further strategic variable of the model that 
contributes  to  output  productivity.  Knowledge  is  a  substitute  for  experience,  but  both 
quantities are typically positive and therefore affect carbon and energy intensities.
4 
 
4. Simulations and Results  
The FEEM-RICE has been used to simulate both policy and long-term stabilization 
scenarios, at the same time accounting for uncertainty on a few key parameters. In particular, 
four policy scenarios have been simulated, which are defined by alternative assumptions on 
the involvement of different areas of the world and different time frames. These are reported 
in Table 1. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Specifically,  Scenario  1  is  the  business-as-usual  projection,  which  is  used  as  a 
benchmark  for  the  evaluation  of  any  other  scenario.  Scenario  2  represents  the  usual 
                                                 
4 For an extensive description of the FEEM-RICE model the reader is referred to Bosetti, Carraro and Galeotti 
(2004). The issue of induced technical change is discussed at length in the same paper and in Carraro and 
Galeotti (2003). The appendix reports all model equations.   13 
assumptions regarding the nearest future, while in Scenario 3 and 4 some kind of engagement 
for subsequent commitment periods is considered. After the U.S. announced its defection 
from the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001, the remaining Kyoto countries, EU and Japan, and - 
from October 2004 - Russia, participate in the Kyoto protocol. This is depicted in the “Kyoto 
Forever  without  U.S.”  (Scenario  2),  where  Annex  B  countries,  except  the  U.S.,  have  to 
comply with the Kyoto target in the first and in subsequent commitment periods. They are 
also allowed to trade emission permits in an international market, while the U.S. undertakes 
abatement efforts according to an energy intensity target. Specifically, this target specifies 
that the country must reduce its intensity ratio by 18% by 2010 relative to the 2000 level. The 
rest of the world has no constraints on emissions. As far as non-U.S. Annex B countries are 
concerned, “2020 Global Target” (Scenario 3) is close to Scenario 2. The U.S. observe the 
same reduction in terms of intensity target in 2010 and minus 10% with respect to Scenario 1 
in  the  second  and  subsequent  commitment  periods.  Developing  countries  adopt  the  same 
unconstrained  Scenario  1  behavior  in  2010  and  2020,  while  10%  reduction  vis-à-vis  the 
business-as-usual scenario is imposed from 2020 onwards. Finally, Scenario 4 differs from 
Scenario 1 only for the third commitment period, in which 2000 emission levels have to be 
achieved by all countries. 
The long-term stabilization target scenarios we consider are summarized in Table 2.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The first set of constraints is on the level of aggregate atmospheric concentrations of CO2, 
which range from 500 to 650 ppmV. The second set relates to the increase in atmospheric 
temperature above pre-industrial levels: here the range of maximum increases allowed goes   14 
from 2.3 to 3 degrees C. The reason why we consider multiple concentration and temperature 
targets derives from the open debate concerning what should be a “realistic” stabilization 
scenario. Nonetheless, for in depth analysis we have concentrated on stabilization levels of 
550 ppmV for CO2 concentrations and 2.5 degree C for temperature, which are considered as 
“appropriate target” by the IPCC (2001). In addition to these two scenarios, we have also 
simulated a radiative forcing stabilization scenario with a target of 4.5 watts per square meter. 
The climate module included in the FEEM-RICE model is a very simplified three box 
cycle.  Nevertheless,  it  roughly  reproduces  dynamic  phenomena  which  are  much  more 
exhaustively detailed and precisely represented in physical-biogeochemical models (see for 
example the papers by Joos, Muller-Furstenberger, and Stephan, 1999, and Joos, Prentice, 
Sitch, Meyer, Hooss, Plattner, Gerber, and Hasselmann, 2001). What is generally recognised 
within this strand of climate literature is that the climate sensitivity parameter is extremely 
uncertain, it is known perhaps only to a factor of three or less; at the same time it plays a key 
role in determining final temperature changes (a detailed discussion on the role of the climate 
sensitivity parameter can be found in Caldeira, Jain, and Hoffert, 2003). Climate sensitivity is 
defined as the global mean climatological temperature change resulting from a doubling of 
atmospheric CO2 content. In several papers the effect of changes in the value of the climate 
sensitivity parameter is investigated, as for example in Nordhaus and Popp (1997) or Gerlagh 
and  van  der  Zwaan  (2004).  In  the  former  paper  the  authors,  investigating  the  effect  of 
parameters uncertainty on model results, underline the importance of taking into account also 
other sources of uncertainty, such as uncertainty concerning the GHG atmospheric retention 
rate.  The  simplified  climate  model  we  use  and  which  is  linked  to  the  economic  module 
represents only the basic dynamics. In particular the climate system is represented as a multi-
strata  system,  composed  by  an  atmosphere  stratum,  an  upper  ocean  and  a  lower-ocean   15 
stratum.
5 A parameter matrix represents the transition from one stratum to the other and the 
retention rate to each stratum. The GHG atmospheric retention rate represents the rate at 
which emissions are retained in the atmosphere stratum. Following these considerations, each 
of  the  long-term  stabilization  scenarios  considered  here  have  been  simulated  for  a  set  of 
different values of these two parameters: the GHG–temperature sensitivity coefficient and the 
GHG-atmospheric retention rate. In particular, the scenarios considering a cap on temperature 
increases have been simulated letting the sensitivity parameter take on values 1.5, 2.5 and 4.5 
degree C per CO2 doubling, as these are commonly considered the most optimistic, probable 
and pessimistic potential realizations of the parameter. As far as the retention parameter is 
concerned, scenarios considering a cap on atmospheric concentrations have been simulated 
for a central value of 60.897, an upper value of 63 and lower value of 61.5. 
We  begin  our  presentation  of  the  results  with  Figure  2  which  displays  global 
emissions when no constraints on emissions are imposed (Scenario 1) vis-à-vis the case of 
maximum emission levels compatible with a global cap on concentration of 550 ppmV. The 
figure also provides the reader with the regional detail as well the temporal evolution of 
emissions. The 550 ppmV target is the “standard” most usually considered in the literature. In 
this respect note that under this stabilization scenario abatement effort has been allocated 
among the different regions purely on the basis of economic efficiency, with no account for 
equity considerations. Comparing BaU and stabilization scenarios we see that appreciable 
differences in emissions start to be perceived only after 2075. Indeed, as reported in Table 3, 
that year is the turning point for emissions under the cap, while in the BaU they increase 
without limit. From the point of view of the regional disaggregation, most of the abatement 
effort is undertaken by the U.S. (and to a lesser extent by Low-Middle Income countries) after 
                                                 
5 See equations (A9)-(A13) in the Appendix. The reader is referred to the description of the climate module in 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000).   16 
the turning point, whereas emissions of the remaining regions do not significantly decrease 
and those of China even increase. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The  evidence  presented  in  Figure  3  is  central  to  this  paper,  in  that  it  shows  the 
emission paths corresponding to the various short term scenarios and to the long term goals. 
The picture appears to suggest that some policy action should take place not too late for the 
short term policy scenarios we have identified to be compatible with our chosen long term 
targets. Note that in the latter case we simply impose a cap at some future date without asking 
how economies would actually meet those targets. It is to be noted that the Kyoto regime soon 
to start appears to be on a compatible emission path, at least up to the second commitment 
period. At the last simulation period we find, as expected, that emissions must be lowest 
under a global temperature limit, relative to a radiative forcing ceiling and even more to a 
stabilization cap. Indeed, Table 3 shows that the turning point for emissions occurs much 
earlier in the case of a temperature ceiling, relative to the bound to radiative forcing and even 
more so relative to a cap to concentrations. Looking at short run policies, in 2105 emissions 
produced by a Kyoto (plus US intensity target) regime (Scenario 2) would be inferior only to 
the unconstrained ones. Interestingly emissions under Scenario 4 – a 2020 global cap – would 
be roughly similar to those produced under a 550 ppmV stabilization scenario. 
Figure 4 and 5 zoom in on the first half of the simulation period, up until 2045, and 
focus on concentration and temperature long term targets, respectively. Can we in this case 
get a clue as to when policy action should be undertaken? And how coherent are such policies 
with concentration and temperature goals respectively? What emerges is a different story for   17 
the  two  targets.  Firstly,  the  most  stringent  targets  –  500  ppmV  concentrations  and  2.3
oC 
temperature reduction – are clearly out of reach of any policy that could be decided for the 
first commitment period. The second interesting finding is that the Kyoto scenario (Scenario 
2) during the first commitment period is actually below the 550 ppmV stabilization target 
(and well below the 650 ppmV cap). This is however not so if we adopt a 2.5
oC temperature 
reduction as our final target. Emissions in this case start to progressively deviate after 2015 
from all other paths. Scenario 2 remains compatible with a 3.0 degree reduction until 2010, 
while it deviates thereafter. A final remark is the notable fact that emissions under the Kyoto 
scenario 2 are coherent with a 650 ppmV stabilization target for the whole second simulation 
period that is from 2025 until 2105. 
The last two pictures, Figure 6 and 7, relate to the uncertainty issue. They plot the 
emission  paths  produced  by  the  four  policy  scenarios,  together  with  those  predicted  by 
simulating just one long-term scenario. Also in this case we zoom in on the first, and more 
relevant,  simulation  period  (up  until  2035).  This  is  a  global  target  on  atmospheric 
concentrations of CO2 (550 ppmV) in Figure 6 and on temperature increase (2.5
oC) in Figure 
7. In the two figures, however, we respectively consider different values of the previously 
mentioned key uncertain parameters. In this way we obtain a “most probable”, an “optimistic” 
and  a  “pessimistic”  concentrations  or  temperature  stabilization  scenarios.  In  both  cases  it 
clearly emerges that if the two parameters take on the corresponding pessimistic value, then 
we are gravely underestimating our mitigation efforts. This is not so however in the most 
probable situation and even more so in the optimistic case. Here we have some difference 
across  the  two  parameters/targets.  In  particular  the  Kyoto  scenario  2,  with  which  we  are 
especially concerned, is compatible, or actually below, both the most probable and optimistic 
550 ppmV concentrations targets (see Figure 6). Instead, when we look at temperature and at   18 
the climate sensitivity parameter, the Kyoto policy is in 2035 below the optimistic case but 
above the most probable situation. This adverse effect takes place only after the last ten years, 
as Kyoto emissions were lower until 2025.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
Choosing long-term goals is a key issue in the climate policy agenda. Targets should 
be easily measurable and feasible, but also effective in damage control. Once goals are set 
globally, given the uncertainty affecting long-term strategies and region-specific preferences 
for different policy instruments, policies will be better represented by a diversified portfolio to 
be revised over time, rather than “once and forever” decisions. It therefore becomes crucial to 
understand to what extent different policy portfolios are consistent with long-term targets, that 
is, when they imply emission paths which do not irreversibly diverge from globally set goals. 
  In  this  paper  we  have  investigated  emission  paths  implied  by  plausible  policy 
scenarios, such as Kyoto-type targets with or without participation by the U.S. and/or by 
developing countries, vis-à-vis different long-term targets on CO2 concentrations, radiative 
forcing  and  the  increase  in  atmospheric  temperature  relative  to  pre-industrial  levels. 
Moreover,  we  have  accounted  for  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  climate  cycle,  by 
considering in the comparison exercise the most probable, optimistic and pessimistic value of 
a couple of key climate model parameters. 
The analysis has been performed using a newly developed version of the FEEM-RICE 
model, a regional economy-climate model of optimal economic growth which is based on 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000)’s RICE model, crucially extended in order to account for induced 
technical  change.  In  particular,  both  carbon  and  energy  intensity  are  affected  by  a  new 
endogenous variable – Technical Progress – which captures both the role of Learning by   19 
Researching and of Learning by Doing. These are in turn determined by the optimal levels of 
Research and Development and of Emission Abatement. 
In general the simulation results appear to suggest that some policy action should take 
place not too late for the short term policy scenarios we have identified to be compatible with 
our chosen long term targets. In particular, it is to be noted that the Kyoto regime soon to start 
appears to be on a compatible emission path, at least up to the second commitment period. At 
the last simulation period we find, as expected, that emissions must be lowest under a global 
temperature limit, relative to a radiative forcing ceiling and even more to a stabilization cap. 
Zooming  in  on  the  first  half  of  the  simulation  period,  up  until  2045,  and  focusing  on 
concentration and temperature long term targets, respectively, we find that the most stringent 
targets – 500 ppmV concentrations and 2.3
oC temperature reduction – are clearly out of reach 
of any policy that could be decided for the first commitment period. In addition, the Kyoto 
scenario during the first commitment period turns out to actually be below the 550 ppmV 
stabilization target (and well below the 650 ppmV cap). This is however not so if we adopt a 
2.5
oC temperature reduction as our final target. A notable fact is that emissions under the 
Kyoto  scenario  are  coherent  with  a  650  ppmV  stabilization  target  for  the  whole  second 
simulation  period  that  is  from  2025  until  2105.  Looking  at  the  uncertainty  affecting  the 
climate parameters of the model, it clearly emerges that if they take on a pessimistic value, 
then we are gravely underestimating our mitigation efforts. This is not so however in the most 
probable situation and even more so in the optimistic case. In particular the Kyoto scenario, 
with  which  we  are  especially concerned, is  compatible,  or  actually  below,  both the  most 
probable  and  optimistic  550  ppmV  concentrations  targets.  Instead,  when  we  look  at 
temperature  the  Kyoto  policy  is  in  2035  below  the  optimistic  case  but  above  the  most 
probable situation.   20 
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Appendix: Model Equations 
 
In this appendix we reproduce the equations that make up the original RICE model, including those 
that have been subsequently modified. 
 
In each region, n, there is a social planner who maximizes the following utility function (n indexes the 
world’s regions, t are 10-years time spans): 
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where the pure time preference discount factor is given by: 
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and the pure rate of time preference r(v) is assumed to decline over time. 
The maximization problem is subject to: 
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List of variables: 
W = welfare  
U = instantaneous utility 
C = consumption 
c = per-capita consumption  
L = population 
R = discount factor 
Q = production 
W = damage 
A = productivity or technology index 
KF = capital stock 
CE = carbon energy 
p
E = cost of carbon energy 
I = fixed investment  
E = carbon emissions   23 
MAT = atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
LU = land-use carbon emissions 
MUP = upper oceans/biosphere CO2 concentrations  
MLO = lower oceans CO2 concentrations  
F = radiative forcing 
T = temperature level 
q￿ = costs of extraction of industrial emissions 
 
List of parameters: 
a, g  = parameters of production function 
dK = rate of depreciation of capital stock 
z = exogenous technical change effect of energy on CO2 emissions (carbon intensity)  
f11, f12, f21, f22, f23, f32, f33 = parameters of the carbon transition matrix 
h = increase in radiative forcing due to doubling of CO2 concentrations from pre-industrial levels 
s1, s2 = temperature dynamics parameters  
l = climate sensitivity parameter 
markup
E￿ = regional energy services markup 
q1, q2 = parameters of the damage function 
PI
AT M = pre-industrial atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
O = increase in radiative forcing over pre-industrial levels due to exogenous anthropogenic causes 
r  = discount rate 
TLO = lower ocean temperature   24 
 
Table 1: Summary of the Four Short Term Policy Scenarios 
  2010  2020  from 2020 onwards 
Scenario 1: “Business-as-usual” 
Annex B-US  business-as-usual  business-as-usual  business-as-usual 
U.S.  business-as-usual  business-as-usual  business-as-usual 
Developing countries  business-as-usual  business-as-usual  business-as-usual 
Scenario 2: “Kyoto Forever without US” 
Annex B-US  Kyoto target: -5.2%  2010 level  2010 level 
U.S.  -18% intensity target  business-as-usual  business-as-usual 
Developing countries  business-as-usual  business-as-usual  business-as-usual 
Scenario 3: “2020 Global Target” 
Annex B-US  Kyoto target: -5.2%  2010 level  2010 level 
U.S.  -18% intensity target  -10%  2020 level 
Developing countries  business-as-usual  business-as-usual  -10% 
Scenario 4: “2020 Global Cap on Emissions” 
Annex B-US  business-as-usual  business-as-usual 
U.S.  business-as-usual  business-as-usual 




Table 2: Summary of the Long Term Target Scenarios 
Constraint  Level 
500 
550 
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Table 3: Summary of the Turning Points for 
Emissions under Alternative Scenarios 
Turning point  World 
Scenario 1  Above 2105 
Scenario 2  Above 2105 
Scenario 3  2105 
Scenario 4  2025 
550 ppmv  2075 
4.5 watt/m2  2055 
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